Towards deriving automated implementation & verification mechanisms from a single machinereadable requirements specification

Using Windows Hardening as proof-of-concept

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Status Quo for almost all SCAP Baselines (with some OpenScap baselines as notable exception)



Implementations and checks are created **and maintained** independently from each other Implementations not part of SCAP content authoring/maintenance

- Is the implementation valid? Right GPO path, etc.
- Is the check really verifying the implementation?

Relation Implementation \leftrightarrow Check is not clear



Status Quo for almost all SCAP Baselines (with some OpenScap baselines as notable exception)

<Rule id="SV-88239r1 rule" severity="medium" weight="10.0"> <version>WN16-CC-000410</version> <title>Remote Desktop Services must be configured with the client connection encryption set to High Level.</title> <fixtext fixref="F-80025r1 fix">Configure the policy value for Computer Configuration >> Administrative Templates >> Windows Components >> Remote Desktop Services >> Remote Desktop Session Host & gt; & gt; & security & gt; & gt; * Set client connection encryption level to "Enabled" with "High Level" selected Issuer of Sec.-Config. Guide **Consumer of Security-Configuration Guide** </fixtext> </Rule> SCAF Tailored" SCAP Automated Human-readable Human-re dable Check Specification & Specification & Export Proprietary Tailoring machine-readable machine-readable Authoring Checks Checks System ሲ ሰ Manual Maintenance Implementation Manual "All-or-nothing" Mechanism Execution Adjustment of plemented Settinas - Ch GPC Backup

Example: IASE Microsoft Windows Server 2016 STIG Benchmark

Goal



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DevOps in Baseline Maintenance:

- Automated Validation
 - Does this GPO path exist? (If not, show alternative candidates)
 - Are the parameter values specified in the guidelines valid?

(If not, show possible candidates)

- Automated Testing:
 - Execute implementation on test-system
 - Check test results before and after

Integration of Hardening in **DevOps**:

- Derive and use environment/systemspecific implementation/check mechanisms
- Support systematic testing via rule-byrule implementation rather than all-ornothing implementation



Our Proof-of-Concept for Windows Hardening



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Example



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Conclusion

- As consumers of CIS and IASE Windows baselines, what we do now is to
 - Use natural language processing to turn human-readable specifications of GPO settings into machine-readable specifications (86.5% fully automated, 13.5% require manual intervention)
 - Use machine-readable implementations to generate required artefacts for DevOps approaches both in maintaining and using security baselines
- What we would like to do:
 - Have CIS/IASE ... specify required GPO settings in machine-readable way
 - Use these machine-readable GPO settings
- As users of SCAP, what we would like is to shift focus a little more on automated implementation than is currently the case
 - our Windows PoC shows that it is possible for certain systems;
 - including machine readable fix elements for Windows GPO settings is possible in SCAP as it is, we just need to agree on a definition for the "fix" system.
- Other systems will be harder to tackle, but for usage of SCAP(v2) in DevSecOps, there is no other way: we need machine-readable specifications of required security configurations.



Contact

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